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I. INTRODUCTION
C ONGRESS PASSED the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946,which waived sovereign immunity for certain tort claims
filed against the United States. Many states have also passed
their own acts that waive sovereign immunity for tort claims filed
against them.
One of the most litigated exceptions to these acts has been
the "discretionary function" exception. Under this exception,
the government's actions are immune from suit if they are based
upon the "performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
discretionary function . . . ."' Courts have struggled to deter-
mine what is and what is not a discretionary function and have
developed several tests to determine the types of government
actions that fall within this exception.
This article will address several issues, including: (1) the his-
tory of sovereign immunity and its impact on airport litigation in
the United States; (2) the waiver of sovereign immunity by the
federal and state governments; (3) the various tests that courts
have developed related to the discretionary function exception;
and (4) the courts' inconsistent application of the discretionary
function exception. Then, this article concludes with a pro-
posed solution to the courts' inconsistent application of the dis-
cretionary function exception.
II. THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN THE UNITED STATES
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed from the com-
mon law maxim, "the King can do no wrong . ... "2 In other
words, the sovereign "cannot be summoned to appear before
himself in his own courts-a doctrine which was transplanted in
modified form from the common law of England to this
country."
One of the first U.S. Supreme Court cases to mention the ap-
plicability of sovereign immunity to this country's jurisprudence
is The Siren.' In The Siren, Justice Stephen Field emphasized that
the United States "cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at
law or in equity without [its] consent; and whoever institutes
such proceedings must bring his case within the authority of
some act of Congress."5 By the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the courts in this country readily accepted this doctrine.6
I Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
2 Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 316 P.2d 265, 270 (Kan. 1957).
3 Id.
4 The Siren, 74 U:S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
5 Id.
6 Marcia Swihart Orgill & Bellane Meltzer Toren, Comment, Sovereign Immunity
and the Discretionary Function Exception of the Alaska Tort Claims Act, 2 ALASKA L. REV.
99, 100 (1985).
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III. APPLICATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO
PUBLIC AIRPORTS PRIOR TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE
CORRESPONDING STATE STATUTES
Courts in this country were not as willing to find municipal
governments immune under the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity as compared to their broad application of this doctrine to
the federal and state governments. In Wendler v. City of Great
Bend, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized this distinction and
noted that "our courts have almost from the beginning denied
tort immunity to municipal governments performing 'proprie-
tary' or 'permissive' functions. The State is usually deemed im-
mune regardless of the kind of function it is performing. What
justifies the difference between the State and its municipal sub-
divisions is baffling."'
Justice William Brennan elaborated on this distinction in
Owen v. City of Independence as follows:
The governmental-proprietary distinction owed its existence to
the dual nature of the municipal corporation. On the one hand,
the municipality was a corporate body, capable of performing the
same "proprietary" functions as any private corporation, and lia-
ble for its torts in the same manner and to the same extent, as
well. On the other hand, the municipality was an arm of the
State, and when acting in that "governmental" or "public" capac-
ity, it shared the immunity traditionally accorded the sovereign."
Many public airports did not enjoy the protection of sover-
eign immunity during the first half of the twentieth century be-
cause courts considered the operation of a public municipal
airport to be a proprietary endeavor.' By 1957, at least seventeen
states had determined that the operation of a municipal airport
was a proprietary function, which could subject the municipality
to liability. 0
7 Wendler, 316 P.2d at 270 (internal citations omitted).
8 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1980).
9 Wendler, 316 P.2d at 273.
10 Id.; see also Mayor of Baltimore v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 122 F.2d 385, 391
(4th Cir. 1941); Patton v. Adm'r of Civil Aeronautics, 112 F. Supp. 817, 825 (D.C.
Alaska 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 217 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1954); City of Mobile v.
Lartigue, 127 So. 257, 260 (Ala. Ct. App. 1930); Peavey v. City of Miami, 1 So. 2d
614, 636-37 (Fla. 1941); Caroway v. City of Atl., 70 S.E.2d 126, 130 (Ga. Ct. App.
1952); Dep't of Treasury v. City of Evansville, 60 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. 1945);
Godfrey v. City of Flint, 279 N.W. 516, 517-18 (Mich. 1938); Heitman v. Lake
City, 30 N.W.2d 18, 21-22 (Minn. 1947); Brummett v. City ofJackson, 51 So. 2d
52, 53 (Miss. 1951); Behnke v. City of Moberly, 243 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Mo. Ct.
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The Kansas Supreme Court came to this conclusion in Wendler
v. City of Great Bend." In Wendler, the plaintiff owned an aircraft
that was destroyed in a hangar fire at the Great Bend Municipal
Airport.1 2 The plaintiff sued the City of Great Bend, alleging
that the fire resulted from the City's negligence." The City ar-
gued that it was immune under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.1"
In its analysis, the Kansas Supreme Court emphasized:
Persuasive is the fact that we have found no decision, and the
defendant has cited none, in which any court of last resort in this
country has held the operation and maintenance of an airport by
a municipality to be a governmental function affording the mu-
nicipality governmental immunity from tort liability in such oper-
ations, except where the municipality has been expressly exempt
from such liability by statute.
The court found that the City was acting in its proprietary capac-
ity by operating a public airport."6 Therefore, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity did not apply, and the airport was subject to
liability. 7
IV. THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES
In 1946, Congress waived immunity for all torts committed by
the U.S. government, except for certain enumerated exceptions,
by passing the Federal Tort Claims Act. 18 This Act resulted from
"a feeling that the Government should assume the obligation to
pay damages for the misfeasance of [its] employees in carrying
App. 1942); Granite Oil Sec. v. Douglas Cnty., 219 P.2d 191, 198 (Nev. 1950);
Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 52 S.E.2d 371, 376 (N.C. 1949); City of Blackwell v.
Lee, 62 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Okla. 1936); Mollencop v. City of Salem, 8 P.2d 783, 785
(Or. 1932); McLaughlin v. City of Chattanooga, 177 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tenn.
1944); Johnson v. City of Corpus Christi, 243 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1951, no writ).
11 Wendler, 316 P.2d at 273-75.
12 Id. at 267-68.
13 Id. at 268.
14 Id. at 267.
15 Id. at 272.
16 Id. at 274-75.
17 Id.
18 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27-30 (1953); Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842-44 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
1402(b), and 2671-2680).
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out its work."" Congress, however, chose not to waive immunity
for:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.20
The states soon followed Congress's example, and "[i]n 1957
Florida became the first American jurisdiction to abolish the
rule that government entities are immune from tort liability
when acting in a governmental, rather than a proprietary, capac-
ity."2' Since that time, most other states have also waived sover-
eign immunity except in certain limited circumstances and have
included an exception to this waiver for actions that constitute a
discretionary function.
The discretionary function exception to the general waiver of
sovereign immunity has been a major source of litigation in
most jurisdictions in this country.23 Courts have struggled to de-
termine what actions are discretionary.24 One commentator
noted that "it is notoriously difficult to translate ordinary words
into legal dictates. Doing so with 'discretion' has been an effort
of near-Herculean proportions."25 The state and federal courts
have developed several tests to determine whether an action is
immune because it is a discretionary function. 6 Commentators
and courts have distilled these tests into the following catego-
ries: (1) the semantic approach; (2) the Good Samaritan ap-
proach; (3) the policy-balancing approach; and (4) the
planning/operational approach.2 7
19 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24.
20 Id. at 18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1948)).
21 Mary F. Wyant, Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government
Tort Liability, 61 MARQ L. REv. 163, 163 (1977).
22 Id. at 167-68.
23 Orgill & Toren, supra note 6, at 103.
24 Id. at 104.
25 John Cannan, Are Public Law Librarians Immune from Suit? Muddying the Al-
ready Murky Waters of Law Librarian Liability, 99 LAw LIBR. J. 7, 14 (2007).
26 Orgill & Toren, supra note 6, at 104
27 Id. at 104-09; Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1232 (2d Cir. 1982).
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
A. THE SEMANTIC APPROACH
Under the semantic approach, the court defines what is or is
not a discretionary act and then applies this definition to the
facts before it.2 8 These cases often depend on the dictionary def-
inition of discretion, generally finding that any "decision involv-
ing some exercise of judgment is worthy of immunity.""2
Although many courts have discussed this approach in their
opinions, it is seldom used because all actions at some level in-
volve the use of discretion. 0 The California Supreme Court de-
scribed this problem as follows:
[I]n rejecting the state's invitation to enmesh ourselves deeply in
the semantic thicket of attempting to determine, as a purely lit-
eral matter, "where the ministerial and imperative duties end
and the discretionary powers begin.... [I] t would be difficult to
conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial,
that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its per-
formance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail.""
Thus, the semantic approach is overly broad because at some
level, a court could find that any action involves some form of
discretion and is, therefore, immune."
In the context of lawsuits involving public airports, one could
consider almost any action taken by an airport as discretionary:
from the design of the taxi cab loading area to the decision of
when and where to inspect the airport terminal building floors
for slip hazards. As a result, the semantic approach, when taken
to the extreme, can quickly become the exception that swallows
the general waiver of sovereign immunity. Consequently, very
few states still apply the semantic approach.
B. THE GOOD SAMARiTAN APPROACH
The Good Samaritan approach is derived from the U.S. Su-
preme Court case of Indian Towing Co. v. United States.34 In that
28 State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 720 (Alaska 1972); Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d
352, 356-58 (Cal. 1968); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So.2d
258, 260 (Fla. 1988); Hudson v. Town of E. Montpelier, 638 A.2d 561, 564 (Vt.
1993).
29 Cannan, supra note 25, at 15.
30 Abbott, 498 P.2d at 720; Johnson, 447 P.2d at 356-57; Yamuni, 529 So.2d at
260; Hudson, 638 A.2d at 564.
31 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 357.
2 Orgill & Toren, supra note 6, at 105.
33 Cannan, supra note 25, at 17.
34 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955).
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case, the Indian Towing Company was towing a barge loaded
with cargo that was damaged when the barge ran aground."
The Indian Towing Company alleged that the barge ran
aground because the U.S. Coast Guard had negligently main-
tained a nearby lighthouse.3 6
On appeal, the United States argued that the Coast Guard
could not be held liable for its negligent maintenance of the
lighthouse because a private individual cannot maintain a light-
house, and the Federal Tort Claims Act provided that "' [t] he
United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
. . .' . In other words, the United States argued that the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act did not remove immunity for activities that
are uniquely governmental.38 The United States, however, con-
ceded that its maintenance of the lighthouse did not involve a
discretionary function."
The Supreme Court emphasized that "it is hornbook tort law
that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and
thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan'
task in a careful manner."4 0 Using this logic, the Supreme Court
held:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But
once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur
Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the
light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the
light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did be-
come extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated
to use due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give
warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in
its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the
United States is liable under the Tort Claims Act."
Despite the fact that the discretionary function exception was
not at issue in Indian Towing, state and federal courts have used
this opinion to develop the Good Samaritan approach to deter-
mine whether a governmental action constitutes a discretionary
3 Id. at 62.
36 Id.
3 Id. at 63 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948)) (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 64.
39 Id.
4 Id. at 64-65.
41 Id. at 69.
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function." These courts have held that sovereign immunity
should only bar claims for "the initial act of governmental dis-
cretion, 'such as a decision to undertake a project,' but does not
extend the immunity to lower levels of decisionmaking, such as
the 'the establishment of plans and specifications by administra-
tors on an intermediate level of government.'""' Thus, this ap-
proach tends to narrow the discretionary function exception
and, in turn, expand the government's liability for all actions
taken after the initial planning phase.
In the context of a public airport, the initial plan to establish
an airport or to alter the operations at the airport would be pro-
tected by sovereign immunity; however, any decision regarding
the maintenance or subsequent functioning of the airport might
be subject to liability. 5 Therefore, the judicial branch may ques-
tion many actions involving the consideration of public policy at
an airport such as when to use airport funds to repair, maintain,
or improve the airport.
C. THE POLICY-BALANCING APPROACH
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many federal courts began
applying the policy-balancing approach. 6 Under this approach,
the government's actions are immune if the subject "action in-
volved the balancing of policy factors." 4 7 Many courts supported
this approach because it "protects courts from 'involve (ment) in
making . . . decisions(s) entrusted to other branches of the
government.' "48
This approach appears to strike a balance between the seman-
tic approach and the Good Samaritan approach because it al-
lows discretion beyond the initial government decision, but the
everyday activities carrying out these decisions are not immune
unless the government employee actually weighs policy factors.
42 Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metro. Topeka Airport Auth., 940 P.2d 84, 94 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1997); Alpha Alpha, Inc. v. Southland Aviation, 697 So. 2d 1364, 1372
(La. Ct. App. 1997); Forrester v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 527 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
43 Orgill & Toren, supra note 6, at 106.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 106-07.
46 Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1232 (2d Cir. 1982).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1233 (alterations in original) (quoting Canadian Trans. Co. v. United
States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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D. THE PLANNING/OPERATIONAL APPROACH
The U.S. Supreme Court created the planning/operational
approach in Dalehite v. United States."* The plaintiffs in Dalehite
sued the United States alleging that it negligently manufactured
and transported fertilizer under a government program, and
that this negligence resulted in the explosion that killed Henry
Dalehite.o
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs did not have a
cause of action against the United States because the govern-
ment's actions were a discretionary function.5 1 The Court
determined:
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where
discretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discre-
tionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under
the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and
activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or adminis-
trators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carry-
ing out the operations of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection
of [§1 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed, that is,
when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step,
each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercis-
ing, perhaps abusing, discretion.5 2
In short, the Court held that "the alleged 'negligence' does
not subject the Government to liability.5 3 The decisions held cul-
pable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than opera-
tional level and involved considerations more or less important to
the practicability of the Government's fertilizer program."5 4
This last statement by the Court has led to much confusion
regarding the application of the planning/operational ap-
proach. As one commentator described:
The Planning/Operational Standard was supposed to be a rela-
tively simplistic and effective means of granting discretionary im-
munity to activities truly worthy of it. However, the surrender of
the Semantic Standard's relative ease of administration and the
49 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953).
50 Id. at 18-23.
51 Id. at 41.
52 Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 42.
54 Id. (emphasis added).
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requirement to determine whether the nature of an activity fell
under the Planning/Operational Standard's aegis led to ad hoc
implementation and inconsistent, even strange, results as courts
struggled to determine what acts were or were not the creation of
policy.55
Courts that want to decrease the scope of the exception in
order to limit immunity will apply the exception to decisions
that are made solely at the planning phase. In contrast, courts
that want to increase the scope of the exception and increase
immunity will apply the exception to actions that implement the
decision made at the planning level. Thus, courts have not con-
sistently applied the planning/operational approach.
V. EVOLUTION OF THE PLANNING/OPERATIONAL
APPROACH
The Supreme Court's next plunge into the quagmire of the
discretionary function analysis occurred in Varig Airlines.16 In
Varig Airlines, the Supreme Court addressed two consolidated
cases to determine if the United States could be held liable for
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) alleged negligence
"in certificating certain aircraft for use in commercial avia-
tion."" In the first lawsuit, a Boeing 707 was certified in 1958 by
the Civil Aeronautics Agency (the FAA's predecessor) as having
met the agency's minimum safety requirements.58 In 1973, a fire
broke out in one of the Boeing 707's aft lavatories during a
flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.59 The pilots landed the air-
plane, but 124 of the passengers died from smoke inhalation. 0
The owner of the Boeing 707, Varig Airlines, and the families of
the deceased passengers sued the United States, alleging that it
was negligent when it issued the safety certificate for the
airplane. 1
In the second of the two consolidated lawsuits, a DeHavilland
Dove aircraft, owned by John Dowdle, caught fire, crashed, and
burned near Las Vegas, Nevada.6 2 Prior to the crash, one of the
5 Cannan, supra note 25, at 20.
56 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
57 Id. at 799.
58 Id. at 800.
59 Id. at 799-800.
6o Id. at 800.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 802.
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aircraft's previous owners obtained a supplemental-type certifi-
cate from the FAA that authorized him to install a cabin heater
as a major change in the type and design of the aircraft.63 After
the crash, Dowdle sued the United States for property damage,
alleging that the FAA was negligent in issuing the certificate for
the installation of the heater."
The plaintiffs in both cases argued that Indian Towing had
overruled Dalehite.65 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and reaffirmed the logic in Dalehite, even though the Court ad-
mitted that "[its] reading of the Act . . . has not followed a
straight line. ."66 The Court reasoned that Indian Towing did
not overturn Dalehite because the government in Indian Towing
"conceded the discretionary function exception was not impli-
cated [in that case]."67
Although the Supreme Court concluded that it is impossible
to specifically define the discretionary function exception, it
provided some guidance on what to consider when determining
whether to apply the exception: (1) one should examine the
conduct of the government actor and determine if it is the type
of act Congress intended to protect, instead of merely examin-
ing the government actor's position; and (2) determine whether
the acts of regulatory agencies within their role as a regulatory
agency are covered by the exception. 8
Using these factors, the Court determined that the FAA's pol-
icy to spot-check manufacturers' compliance with its regulatory
guideline was "the sort of governmental conduct protected by
the discretionary function exception to the Act."6 9 Specifically,
the Court found that " [t] he FAA has a statutory duty to promote
safety in air transportation, not to insure it.... [Therefore, the
plaintiffs' claims] against the FAA for its alleged negligence in
certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred
by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act."o7
63 Id. at 802-03.
- Id. at 803.
65 Id. at 811.
- Id. at 811-12.
67 Id. at 812.
- Id. at 813-14.
69 Id. at 815-16.
70 Id. at 821.
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A more recent Supreme Court case to analyze the discretion-
ary function exception is Berkovitz v. United States. In this case,
an infant contracted polio after ingesting an oral polio vaccine
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved for
release to the public. The plaintiffs alleged that the FDA was
negligent because it "violated federal law and policy regarding
the inspection and approval of polio vaccines."7 3
The Supreme Court determined that federal courts should
apply the following two-prong test when analyzing whether the
discretionary function exception applies:
[A] court must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice
for the acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of
the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves
an element of judgment or choice. . . . [The] exception will not
apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow."
If the challenged conduct is a matter of choice, "a court must
[then] determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield [:] . . .
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of
public policy.""
The plaintiffs asserted two claims against the government: (1)
the government "violated a federal statute and accompanying
regulations in issuing a license" to the manufacturer to produce
the vaccine; and (2) the government violated "federal regula-
tions and policy in approving the release of the particular lot" of
the vaccine containing plaintiffs dose."
The Court determined that the discretionary function excep-
tion did not bar the plaintiffs' claims that the federal govern-
ment did not comply with federal law in licensing and approving
the vaccine.7 1 It remanded the case for further fact-finding re-
garding the plaintiffs' claims that the government determined
that the vaccine "complied with regulatory standards, but that
the determination was incorrect"; the Court found that such de-
71 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
72 Id. at 533.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 536-37 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35 (1953)).
76 Id. at 539-40.
77 Id. at 542-45, 548.
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cisions would involve the government's exercise of a policy
choice.
The Supreme Court determined, however, that the discretion-
ary function exception barred the plaintiffs' claim that the gov-
ernment was negligent in allowing the manufacturer to release
that particular dose of vaccine because the FDA's spot-check
program was similar to the FAA's program in Varig Airlines."
Another Supreme Court case in the evolution of the plan-
ning/operational approach is United States v. Gaubert.80 In
Gaubert, the United States, pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933, "undertook to advise about and oversee certain as-
pects of the operation of a thrift institution," the Independent
American Savings Association (IASA) .81 The Supreme Court
had to determine if these actions were within the discretionary
function exception."
The United States, through the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, "sought to have IASA merge with Investex Savings, a fail-
ing Texas thrift."8 ' As part of the merger, the government re-
quested that IASA's chairman, Thomas Gaubert, enter an
agreement removing him from LASA's management because of
Gaubert's other financial dealings.84 The government did not
institute formal proceedings against LASA because "they relied
on the likelihood that LASA and Gaubert would follow their sug-
gestions and advice."85
Three years after the merger, Gaubert sued the federal gov-
ernment for "$100 million in damages for the alleged negli-
gence of federal officials in selecting the new officers and
directors and in participating in the day-to-day management of
IASA."8 6
The Court summarized its discretionary function analysis as
follows:
[I]f a regulation mandates particular conduct, and the employee
obeys the direction, the Government will be protected because the
action will be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to
78 Id. at 544-45.
79 Id. at 546-547.
80 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991).
81 Id. at 317-18.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 319.
84 Id.
85 Id.
8 Id. at 320.
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the promulgation of the regulation. If the employee violates the
mandatory regulation, there will be no shelter from liability be-
cause there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary
to policy. On the other hand, if a regulation allows the employee dis-
cretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption
that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves con-
sideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of
the regulations."
In what appears to be a deviation from the language in
Dalehite, the Court emphasized that an act does not necessarily
have to involve policy making at the planning level to receive
immunity." The Court emphasized that "[d]ay-to-day manage-
ment of banking affairs, like the management of other busi-
nesses, regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of
permissible courses is the wisest. Discretionary conduct is not
confined to the policy or planning level."" In short, the Court
stressed that none of its prior holdings suggested that "decisions
made at an operational level could not also be based on
policy.""o
Furthermore, the Court refined the second prong of the two-
prong test from Berkovitz by emphasizing that "[w]hen estab-
lished governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute,
regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to
exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent's acts are
grounded in policy when exercising that discretion."" Stated an-
other way, the Supreme Court told the lower courts that they no
longer had to determine if the government employee actually
exercised the type of discretion that is protected by the excep-
tion, if the employee's actions could have been based upon pol-
icy decisions or implied by policy espoused in a statute,
regulation, or guideline."
Gaubert argued that the government's actions were not cov-
ered because they involved the government controlling the day-
to-day activities of IASA, including the hiring of consultants, the
conversion of IASA from a state-charted savings and loan to a
federally charted savings and loan, the placement of LASA sub-
87 Id. at 324 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 325.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 325-26.
91 Id. at 324 (emphasis added). See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536
(1988).
92 See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324-25.
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sidiaries in bankruptcy, the mediation of salary disputes, and re-
view of a complaint that IASA had considered filing.9 3
The Supreme Court determined that "[t] here [were] no alle-
gations that the regulators gave anything other than the kind of
advice that was within the purview of the policies behind the stat-
utes."" Therefore, the Court found that the discretionary func-
tion exception barred Gaubert's claims."
One commentator determined that the U.S. government,
since Gaubert, has succeeded on 76.30% of its motions for sum-
mary judgment based upon the discretionary function
exception.9 6
VI. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION IN
THE CONTEXT OF AIRPORT LITIGATION
IN STATE COURTS
A. Mississippi's LIBERAL USE OF THE PLANNING/OPERATIONAL
APPROACH
In 2012, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Pratt v. Gulfport-Bi-
loxi Regional Airport Authority handed down a decision under the
guise of the planning/operational approach." The court's ap-
plication of this approach, however, appears similar to the se-
mantic approach.9 8 Under the court's reasoning, almost any act
by a Mississippi airport authority could be considered immune.
In Pratt, Dr. Jerry Pratt sued the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Air-
port Authority after he "slipped and fell down a set of stairs at
the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport."" The airport used the
metal stairs "as a temporary means of accessing the tarmac from
the terminal" while the airport was under construction.10 0 As an
additional safety precaution, the airport's employees added anti-
slip tape to the stairs.101 Prior to falling, Dr. Pratt began to climb
down the stairs.10 2 The stairs were wet from the rain, which
93 Id. at 327-28.
94 Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 332, 334.
96 Stephen L. Nelson, The King's Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: Under-
standing the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 S. TEX.
L. REV. 259, 292-93 (2009).
9 Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth., 97 So. 3d 68, 73 (Miss. 2012).
98 See id. at 72-76.
9 Id. at 70.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 71.
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caused Dr. Pratt to slip and fall down the stairs onto the
tarmac.o1
0 3
The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that in order to
find that the airport's actions were within the discretionary func-
tion exception, it "must ascertain whether the activity in ques-
tion involved an element of choice or judgment. If so, [the court]
also must decide whether that choice or judgment involved so-
cial, economic, or political-policy considerations."104 To deter-
mine if the activity involved an element of choice or judgment,
"the [c] ourt must first ascertain whether the activity was discre-
tionary or ministerial."' An act "is discretionary if 'it is not im-
posed by law and depends upon the judgment or choice of the
government entity or its employee [s]."'" Conversely, "[a] min-
isterial function is one positively imposed by law and required to
be performed at a specific time and place, removing an officer's
or entity's choice or judgment."0 7
In its analysis, the court radically departed from the argument
framed by the parties by stating:
[T] he parties agreed that the activity at issue-placing anti-slip
tape on the temporary airstairs-was not a ministerial function,
as there are no laws or regulations pertaining to this activity....
However, that is not the "function" at issue. The function with
which we are concerned is the operation of the airport. The state
does not have a statutory obligation to provide and operate air-
ports for its citizens. A decision by the state, county, municipality,
or other governmental entity to operate an airport is discretion-
ary. Therefore, barring a rule or regulation pertaining to a cer-
tain activity, decisions that are part of the airport's day-to-day
operations are also discretionary.'
Then, the court found that the Airport Authority was immune
because "the airport authority's decision to make improvements
to the facility took economic factors into consideration. The use
of the airstairs ... [and] adding anti-slip tape to the stairs . .. are
daily operational decisions that fall under the overall operation
of the airport."1 09
103 Id.
104 Id. at 72 (emphasis added) (quoting Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Montgomery,
80 So. 3d 789, 795 (Miss. 2012)).
105 Id. (citing Dancy v. E. Miss. State Hosp., 944 So. 2d 10, 16-18 (Miss. 2006)).
106 Id. (quoting Montgomery, 80 So. 3d at 795).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 72.
109 Id. at 75.
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Under Mississippi's application of the planning/operational
approach, it appears that almost any action by an airport author-
ity employee in running an airport is immune because a court
could easily find that it is supported by the city's discretionary
decision to have a public airport.
B. ALASR A's CONSERVATIVE USE OF THE PLANNING/
OPERATIONAL APPROACH
In Japan Air Lines Co. v. State, Alaska applied the planning/
operational approach in a lawsuit involving an airport."o A Boe-
ing 747 owned by Japan Air Lines was damaged while taxiing at
Anchorage International Airport because the taxiway was cov-
ered with black ice." Japan Air Lines' insurer sued the State for
the property damage to the Boeing 747 that resulted from the
aircraft sliding on the taxiway.112
The Alaska Supreme Court determined that "decisions that
rise to the level of planning or policy formulation will be consid-
ered discretionary acts which are immune from tort liability,
whereas decisions that are merely operational in nature, thereby
implementing policy decisions, will not be considered discre-
tionary and therefore will not be shielded from liability."" 3
The court found that the plaintiffs claim was not barred by
the discretionary function exception because "[o]nce the basic
policy decision to build ... a taxiway at Anchorage International
Airport was made, the state was obligated to use due care to make
certain that the taxiway met the standard of reasonable safety for
its users." 14
More recently, the Alaska Supreme Court revisited the plan-
ning/operational approach in airport litigation in State Depart-
ment of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Sanders."5 In Sanders,
the plaintiff struck a baggage train operated by United Airlines
while driving his motorcycle on a public road."lb The plaintiff
sued the state of Alaska because "the Airport had adopted a
practice of allowing aircraft support vehicles, including baggage
trains, to operate on [the public road] without complying with
no Japan Air Lines Co. v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska 1981).
111 Id. at 935.
112 Id. at 935-36.
11 Id. at 936.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 State Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. Sanders, 944 P.2d 453, 456
(Alaska 1997).
116 Id. at 455.
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certain motor vehicle regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Public Safety.""'
The court emphasized that "[u]nder the planning/opera-
tional test, liability is the rule, immunity the exception."118 This
court, like the court in Japan Air Lines, determined that the
State's decision to allow baggage trains to operate on the public
road was immune under the discretionary function exception;
however, "once the State decided to open the road to such vehi-
cles, it was obligated to do so in a non-negligent manner."' 19
C. IDAHO'S USE OF THE PLANNING/OPERATIONAL APPROACH
In Tomich v. City of Pocatello, the Idaho Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the planning/operational approach in an airport case
produced results similar to the Good Samaritan approach.12 0 In
Tomich, Todd and Max Tomich jointly owned a 1967 Citabria
7ECA, which they tied down and parked at an airport owned by
the City of Pocatello, Idaho. 1 21 The City did not charge them a
tie-down fee, and they continued to park and tie down the air-
plane at this airport from 1984 to 1991.122
Eventually, a windstorm caused the tie-downs to fail, and "the
plane tumbled down the runway and [was] destroyed."123 The
Tomiches sued the City, alleging that the City failed to "provide
and maintain a safe area in which to tie down aircraft."124
On appeal, the City argued it was immune under the discre-
tionary function exception to the Idaho Tort Claims Act because
"it passed an ordinance embodying the policy decision not to
maintain the airport's tie-downs because of budget
constraints."12
Under Idaho's version of the planning/operational test,
"[r]outine matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy fac-
tors will likely be 'operational,' whereas decisions involving a
consideration of the financial, political, economic, and social ef-
u1 Id.
118 Id. at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119 Id. at 460.





125 Id. at 504.
6832014]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [ 79
fects of a particular plan are likely 'discretionary' and will be
accorded immunity.""
The court determined:
The ordinance reflects a desire to limit the city's liability . .. not a
decision to reduce or eliminate maintenance at the airport....
Here, rather than reach a policy decision on airport mainte-
nance, the city tried to make a policy decision that it would not
be liable for anything that happened at the airport. Therefore,
the discretionary function exception does not immunize the
city. 127
Thus, Idaho's application severely limits the discretionary
function exception and appears to be similar to the Good Sa-
maritan approach because the court second-guessed the City's
decision not to repair the tie-downs. 12 Furthermore, the court
found that the City had a duty to run the airport reasonably
despite the City basing its decision to not replace the tie-downs
on budgetary considerations. 1 2
D. LOuISIANA's PLANNING/OPERATIONAL APPROACH
In Alpha Alpha, Inc. v. Southland Aviation, the Louisiana Court
of Appeals used what appears to be the Good Samaritan ap-
proach in an airport case.so In that case, Alpha Alpha pur-
chased a twin-engine aircraft, the Merlin, from Associated
Aircraft Sales and leased it to Travelair Charters."' In order to
avoid Texas ad valorem taxes, a representative of Associated Air-
craft Sales, Steven Weintraub, arranged to temporarily park the
Merlin at Southland Field, a public airport in Sulphur, Louisi-
ana."1 2 Mr. Weintraub requested hangar space for the Merlin,
but the airport manager told him, "the hangars were being re-
modeled and were not available."' 3 The airport manager also
told him that the Merlin would be safely parked on the ramp.'3 4
According to Mr. Weintraub, he and the airport manager
126 Id. (quoting Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 886 P.2d 330, 336 (Idaho 1994)).
127 Id. at 505.
128 See id.; see also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65
(1955).
129 See Tomich, 901 P.2d at 505.
130 Alpha Alpha, Inc. v. Southland Aviation, 697 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (La. Ct.
App. 1997).
131 Id. at 1366.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1366-67.
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agreed that "he would pay [the manager] for the tie-down fees
when [he] returned to fly the aircraft back to Texas .... "'
Unknown individuals vandalized the Merlin at the airport on
two separate occasions. 136 Alpha and Travelair sued the West
Calcasieu Port, Harbor, and Terminal District; the Industrial De-
velopment Board of the City of Sulphur, who owned the airport;
and the West Calcasieu Airport Managing Board d/b/a South-
land Aviation, who managed the airport, alleging that these de-
fendants were negligent in their duties as compensated
depositaries.' 3 7
The defendants argued that "the decision on the need for se-
curity provided [for] the aircraft at Southland Field was a deci-
sion made at the ministerial level by Southland Aviation, the
airport managing board, and that the board is immune from
liability under the discretionary function doctrine .. ."8
The court of appeals set forth Louisiana's version of the plan-
ning/operation approach as follows:
First, the court must determine whether the government's action
was a matter of choice. If the action was not a matter of choice
because some statute, regulation, or policy prescribed a specific
course of action to follow, then the exception does not apply and
there is no immunity. If, on the other hand, the action involved
an element of choice or discretion, then the court must deter-
mine whether that discretion is the type that is shielded by the
exception because it is grounded in social, economic, or political
policy. It is only those actions that are based on public policy that
are protected by La.R.S. 9:2798.1.1"
The court held that the discretionary function exception did
not apply and that the defendants were not immune from suit
because once the airport decided to become a public-use airport
and to become "a depositary of the Merlin . .. the defendants
had no choice but to abide by applicable legal standards in dis-
charging that function. "140
Yet again, a state court ostensibly applied the planning/opera-
tional approach, but in effect, it applied the Good Samaritan
approach. Despite the fact that the city had a valid argument
that the exception did not apply, i.e. its diescretion to accept
135 Id. at 1367.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1367-68.
138 Id. at 1371.
139 Id. at 1372 (internal citations omitted).
140 Id.
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incoming aircraft, the court determined that the airport had a
duty to act reasonably once it decided to allow the plaintiffs to
park the Merlin at the airport."'
E. KANSAS'S APPLICATION OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN APPROACH
The Kansas Court of Appeals employed a version of the Good
Samaritan approach, although not titling it as such, in Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority.14 2 In that case,
"Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) and Sun Life Insurance
Company of America (Sun Life) [sued] the Metropolitan To-
peka Airport Authority (MTAA) to recover damages for aircraft
destroyed in a hangar fire at Forbes Field Airport."1 4 3
The fire began because a contractor was using a propane
torch to replace the hangar's roof.14 4 The fire destroyed the
hangar along with "13 airplanes-10 owned by Cessna and 3
which Cessna leased from Sun Life."1 4 5 The case proceeded to
trial, and the jury returned a verdict against the airport and sev-
eral other defendants.14 6
The court of appeals noted that the airport:
[U]ndertook to provide its tenants ... with fire and police pro-
tection. Moreover, [it] adopted rules and regulations restricting
persons from entering hangars without permission and from per-
forming work on a hangar without written permission from air-
port management. Other regulations restricted the use of flame
operations and the storage of flammable materials in hangars.
MTAA further represented that it would provide Cessna with the
same type of services offered its other tenants. 147
In its amicus curiae brief, the League of Kansas Municipalities
argued that the airport was immune because the airport's act of
providing fire protection to its lessees was discretionary."1 8
The court rejected this argument and held that "once a gov-
ernmental entity undertakes to provide those services, and to
adopt mandatory regulations and policies in connection with
those services, discretionary immunity does not protect the gov-
141 Id.
142 Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metro. Topeka Airport Auth., 940 P.2d 84, 94 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1997).




47 Id. at 92.
148 Id. at 94.
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ernmental entity from liability for a failure to provide services in
accord with those regulations and policies." 149
F. NEW YoRK's APPLICATION OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN TEST
In Forrester v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Graeme
Forrester's flight landed at Kennedy Airport."'o He went to the
taxi loading area at the airport, and the taxi dispatcher directed
him to a cab.1"' As he walked around the cab to get into the
front passenger seat, he was hit by another cab.' 52
He "sued [Trans World Airlines] and the Port Authority,
which operates Kennedy Airport and subleases certain areas of
the Airport to airlines, [including the taxi loading area], pre-
mised upon their negligent design and maintenance of the taxi
loading area. 5
The Port Authority argued that it was immune because its de-
sign of the taxi loading area constituted a discretionary func-
tion."' The court rejected this argument and held that
"[r]egardless of whether the operation of a taxi loading zone
constitutes a governmental function, such immunity would not
absolve the Port Authority from liability for a design devised
without adequate study or one lacking a reasonable basis.""
The Forrester court appears to use the Good Samaritan test be-
cause, even if the design of the taxi loading areas involved the
types of decisions that were meant to be protected by the excep-
tion, the court is unlikely to find the airport immune if it did
not act reasonably in carrying out such decisions.
G. OREGON'S POLICY RANKING APPROACH
The Oregon Court of Appeals applied the discretionary func-
tion exception to a case involving a crash at the Flying M
Ranch.' 6 In that case, the plaintiffs sued the state of Oregon for
wrongful death after their decedent died as a passenger in an
149 Id.
150 Forrester v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 527 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
151 Id. at 225-26.
152 Id. at 226.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 227.
155 Id.
156 Walker v. Mitchell, 891 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
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aircraft that crashed as it took off from the Flying M Ranch
Airport.15 7
The plaintiffs alleged that the state's Aeronautics Division
negligently classified the Flying M Ranch Airport as a personal
use airport, which "exempt[ed] it from the dimensional stan-
dards, including standards governing runway length and 'glide
slope,' applicable to 'public use' airports . . . . They further
alleged that this misclassification contributed to the decedent's
death. 159
The State argued that the act of classifying an airport as a per-
sonal use airport versus a public use airport was immune from
liability because it was a discretionary function.16 0
The court of appeals determined that for the Division's ac-
tions to fall within the discretionary function exception, the ac-
tions must involve an "'assessment and ranking of the policy
objectives explicit or implicit in the statute' and for the judg-
ment that one or more of these objectives will be served by a
given action."1 6'
Using this approach, the court found that based upon the re-
cord before it, it could not tell whether the Division's decision
to classify the Flying M Ranch as a "private use" airport was nec-
essarily based upon the ranking and assessment of policy objec-
tives.'6 2 This approach appears closer to what the Supreme
Court's planning/operational approach has evolved into be-
cause a court must assess the government's immunity based
upon whether the action in question involved the balancing and
ranking of policy objectives.
VII. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION IN
THE CONTEXT OF AIRPORT LITIGATION
IN FEDERAL COURTS
Because of the limited guidance given by the U.S. Supreme
Court, lower federal courts have also had difficulty determining
what sorts of actions fall within the discretionary function excep-
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1360-61.
159 Id.
160 Id.




In AIG Aviation Insurance Services, Inc. v. United States, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah analyzed the discretionary
function exception under both the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.6's In that case, South
Coast Helicopter landed a Bell helicopter at the Brigham City,
Utah, airport for refueling.1 6' The airport's manager told the
helicopter's pilot that he could buy fuel from Flying J, "a private
corporate operator . . . ."6 As the helicopter flew from the
ramp area to the Flying J Hangar, it "struck two unmarked
power lines suspended approximately 30 feet above the taxiway.
The helicopter crashed and was a total loss, less salvage."166
South Coast and AIG Aviation Insurance Services, South
Coast's insurer, sued the United States and the Brigham City
Corporation."' Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
United States, through the actions of the FAA, "was negligent in
specifying, approving, operating, maintaining, and inspecting
the airport facilities, and in not requiring that the power lines in
question be buried," and that the City was negligent because it
failed to bury or mark the power lines.' 8 The United States
moved to dismiss the case under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
and the City moved for dismissal under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.' 9
The plaintiffs argued that the discretionary function excep-
tion did not apply to their claims against the United States be-
cause two federal directives mandated that the FAA correct the
hazardous power line.o Therefore, the FAA's decision regard-
ing the power lines did not involve a choice or judgment and
should not be immune under the Act.' First, they argued that
the FAA Airport Safety Data Program Order 5010.4 required the
FAA to inspect the airport and to "' [] ook for and report all
items on the airport that could be hazardous, such as unmarked
obstructions . . . and other safety hazards on or near the run-
way.' "'112 The plaintiffs relied upon the fact that the FAA had
163 AIG Aviation Ins. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 1496, 1502 (D.
Utah 1995).
164 Id. at 1497.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1497-98.




172 Id. at 1498-99.
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inspected the airport five times prior to the incident and did not
list the power lines in any of its reports from these
inspections.'7 3
The district court found that the FAA's actions, however, fell
within the discretionary function exception because the FAA's
inspector was impliedly vested "with discretion to determine
which items 'could be' hazardous." 7 4 Thus, the court reasoned
that this act involved choice or judgment on the part of the in-
spector.1 7 5 Then, it determined that "the inspector's decision
not to report the power lines" was immune from suit under the
discretionary function exception because the inspector's judg-
ment was "grounded in the relevant policy scheme." 7 6
The plaintiffs also argued that the FAA violated "FAA Advisory
Circular 150/5300-13, dated September 29, 1989," because it
failed to "'report the obstructing power lines following the con-
struction and marking of the taxiway' and . . . 'fail[ed] to clear
or require the clearance of the taxiway.' "177 The court deter-
mined that the circular's requirements did not apply, and the
court dismissed the case against the United States.17 8
Next, the court addressed the City's motion to dismiss under
the Utah Act.' 7 9 Under the Act, a court must answer the follow-
ing questions in the affirmative for the exception to apply:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily
involve a basic governmental policy, program, or
objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to
the realization or accomplishment of that policy, pro-
gram, or objective as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of the policy, program, or
objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of
basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the
part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requi-
site constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty
173 Id. at 1499.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1500.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1500-02.
179 Id. at 1502.
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to do or make the challenged act, omission, or
decision?'
The court answered these questions in favor of the City and de-
termined that the City was immune from the plaintiffs' claims
because the City's decision not to bury the power lines was bal-
anced with its budgetary restrictions against the danger posed by
the power lines.1"'
The federal courts have also inconsistently applied the discre-
tionary function exception to lawsuits involving customs agents
detaining passengers at public airports.'8 2 In DePass v. United
States, Derrick Anthony DePass sued the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that he was improperly de-
tained at the Baltimore-Washington International Airport by
"the United States Customs Service, the Maryland Aviation Ad-
ministration, the Maryland Department of Transportation, East-
ern Airlines, Inc., and Burns Security, Inc."'18 Mr. DePass also
alleged that the defendants' detainment was an assault and
battery.'
The defendants argued that Mr. DePass did not provide "satis-
factory proof of United States citizenship upon his arrival at BWI
from Montego Bay, Jamaica on an Eastern Airlines flight." 18
After dismissing all of the defendants except the United
States, the district court addressed the United States' motion to
dismiss based upon the discretionary function exception under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.'8 Because of the seemingly contra-
dictory results in Dalehite and Indian Towing, the court deter-
mined that "the Supreme Court has failed to set clear guidelines
to determine when this exception applies."'8 " Therefore, it re-
jected the planning/operational approach recommended by
the plaintiff because under the plaintiffs version of the test,
180 Id. at 1503-04.
181 Id. at 1504-05.
182 Compare DePass v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 373 (D. Md. 1979), with
Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1982).




187 Id. at 375; see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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only discretionary acts of the government made at the planning
level are immune from suit.""
The court determined that Congress intended the exception
to include those actions that involve governmental policy, no
matter the rank of the governmental official involved. 9 The
court held that DePass's claims against the United States were
barred by the discretionary function exception because the ap-
plicable statutes and regulations do not dictate to immigration
inspectors how they must determine that someone is a U.S. citi-
zen.19 o Furthermore, the court found that the inspector's ac-
tions were the types of actions that Congress intended to protect
under the discretionary function exception because "each time
an immigration inspector examines someone to determine
whether he is a United States citizen, the inspector is in effect
setting a policy that affects our international relations and which
has social, economic, and political repercussions in this country
as well."I91
Three years later, the Second Circuit contradicted DePass in
Caban v. United States.19 2 In Caban, Salvador Caban alleged that
he was damaged when the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) improperly detained him atJohn F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport.'91 Despite Mr. Caban producing a Puerto Rican
birth certificate, a New York driver's license, a social security
card, and other documentation, INS detained Mr. Caban and
took him to an INS detention center.' After Mr. Caban filed
suit, the government moved for summary judgment and argued
that Mr. Caban's claim was barred by the discretionary function
exception."'
In its analysis, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals lamented
that "[t]he discretionary function exception to the FTCA has
presented courts with problems almost from the time of its en-
actment in 1946. The principal difficulty is simply that all fed-
eral employees exercise a certain amount of discretion in the
discharge of their responsibilities." 9 6 The court warned that a
188 DePass, 479 F. Supp. at 375. It should be noted that this case preceded the
Supreme Court opinions in Varig Airlines, Berkowitz, and Gaubert.
189 Id. at 375.
190 Id. at 376-77.
19, Id. at 377.
192 Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1233 (2d Cir. 1982).
193 Id. at 1230.
194 Id. at 1231.




literal interpretation of the exception, such as under the seman-
tic approach, would lead to the exception swallowing "the gen-
eral rule that waives the United States' immunity to suits arising
out of its employees' actions.""'7
After discussing the history of the various discretionary func-
tion tests, the court adopted and used the "policy balancing
test," which requires a court to find that a governmental offi-
cial's actions fall within the exception if the action requires the
official to "consider and weigh competing policies in arriving at
his decision . . . ."" Using this test, the court determined that
Caban's claim against the United States was not barred by the
discretionary function exception because the INS agents' ac-
tions in detaining Mr. Caban did not require the agents "to con-
sider and weigh competing polices." 99 The court emphasized
that "if Caban were suing the INS for adopting [the regulation
regarding an applicant's entry rights into the United States], he
would find his case properly dismissed" because this involved
the weighing of competing policies. 20 0
Nearly two decades later, the federal courts again addressed a
case similar to DePass and Caban in Bradley v. United States.20' Af-
ter she returned from Jamaica, Yvette Bradley "was stopped [by]
United States Customs Inspectors at Newark International Air-
port."202 She alleged she "was singled out for a luggage search,
subjected to a pat down search, and ultimately released by Cus-
toms officers."203
Bradley sued the United States, the Customs Service, and the
customs agents, alleging that she was searched "because she is a
black woman."20 4 The defendants argued that their actions were
immune under the discretionary function exception. 0 5 Apply-
ing the Supreme Court's test from Gaubert, the court deter-
mined that the customs agents' actions were immune from suit
under the discretionary function exception because the customs
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1232-33.
199 Id. at 1233.
200 Id.
201 Bradley v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441-42 (D. N.J. 2001), affd,
299 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002).
202 Id. at 442.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 454.
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agents' decision to search Ms. Bradley was a discretionary act
that implicated public policy. 206
VIII. WHERE AIRPORT LITIGATION CURRENTLY
STANDS WITH RESPECT TO THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The case law interpreting the discretionary function excep-
tion to the general waiver of sovereign immunity is legion. How-
ever, courts, practitioners, and commentators seem to be as
confused today about the proper scope of the discretionary
function exception as they were when Dalehite was decided in
1953. While analyzing the discretionary function exception
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, one commentator noted
that the exception is confusing to both scholars and federal
judges, and it is "the most criticized and litigated exception" to
the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 07 Likewise, "[s]tate court judges
have struggled as hard as their federal brethren to strike the
right balance between plaintiffs and policy makers" when inter-
preting this exception.208
This confusion is readily apparent in the context of airport
litigation. Mississippi courts have declared that the day-to-day
operations of a public airport are discretionary and should be
afforded immunity. 209 Justice Robert Jackson summarized the
policy of the courts that have liberally applied the discretionary
function exception when he commented that "[o]f course, it is
not a tort for government to govern .... "210
On the other hand, Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana, and New York
courts have determined that airports must act reasonably after
the initial planning phase.2 1' The Louisiana Court of Appeals
aptly described the policy behind these courts' decisions when it
206 Id.; see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991).
207 Nelson, supra note 96, at 262.
208 Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis:
United States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 447, 489 (1997).
20 See Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'1 Airport Auth., 97 So. 3d 68, 75-77 (Miss.
2012).
210 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
211 SeeJapan Air Lines Co. v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 938 (Alaska 1981); Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Metro. Topeka Airport Auth., 940 P.2d 84, 94 (Kan. Ct. App.
1997); Alpha Alpha, Inc. v. Southland Aviation, 697 So. 2d 1364, 1371-72 (La. Ct.




declared that "there is a difference between exercising discre-
tion and abdicating responsibility."2 1 2
Even the federal courts have failed to consistently apply the
Supreme Court's planning/operational approach. The exact
same case can come before two different district courts, the
United States can argue that it is immune under the discretion-
ary function exception in both cases, and one court might find
that the United States is immune while the other court finds
that the United States is liable.
In addition, it appears that some states, because of their ex-
pansive interpretation of the discretionary function exception,
may have actually decreased their public airports' liability as
compared to such liability prior to the states' waiver of sovereign
immunity.213
IX. A WORKABLE SOLUTION
Because the courts have had approximately sixty-eight years to
develop a feasible test for consistently deciding what is a discre-
tionary function and have failed to do so, this article recom-
mends that Congress and the state legislatures step in and
actually define the term "discretionary function." By defining
what is and what is not a discretionary function, the legislative
branch can send a message to the courts that the current system
does not work. Furthermore, the legislative branch can act
quickly and need not wait for a case to come before it in order
to alter the state of the law.
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 contains the definitions section
of the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 1 4 This section defines terms
used in the Act such as "employee of the government" and "act-
ing within the scope of his office or employment."2 1 Congress
and the state legislatures can clear up the confusion created by
the discretionary function exception, as currently written, by
simply defining what "a discretionary function or duty" is in the
definitions sections of their respective tort claims acts.
The definition, however, must be carefully crafted to strike a
balance between the legislative purpose of the tort claims acts,
212 Alpha Alpha, 697 So. 2d at 1372.
213 Compare Brummett v. City ofJackson, 51 So. 2d 52, 53 (Miss. 1951) (holding
that airport could be held liable for negligently maintaining tie downs), with
Pratt, 97 So. 3d at 72 (holding that airport was immune for negligently maintain-
ing ladder to exit terminal onto tarmac).
214 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2012).
215 Id.
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which is to give wronged parties redress from the government
for torts it commits, and the purpose of the discretionary func-
tion exception, which is to prevent the judiciary from second-
guessing the policy decisions of the other branches of
government.216
Based upon tests created by other commentators for courts to
apply and a test previously adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
under Utah's discretionary function test, Congress and the state
legislatures should add the following definition to their respec-
tive tort claims acts in order to strike the proper balance men-
tioned above.
A discretionary function is an act, omission, or decision that:
1. involves a matter of choice by a government employee;
2. is essential to the realization of a governmental policy, pro-
gram, or objective;
3. involves the actual and legitimate evaluation of a policy de-
cision on the part of the government employee with the
requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority to di-
rect policy. 217
A. AN ACT, OMISSION, OR DECISION THAT INVOLVES
A MATTER OF CHOICE
This element is already part of the planning/operation ap-
proach. However, it should also be incorporated into any statu-
tory definition of discretionary function because it would be a
poor policy decision if governmental actors could be immune
for violating a statute or regulation. Without this language, a
court might reward the government for committing negligence
by ignoring a deliberative policy decision.
B. AN ACT, OMISSION, OR DECISION THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
REALIZATION OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY,
PROGRAM, OR OBJECTIVE
To ensure that plaintiffs are made whole if the government
acted negligently, and to inhibit the judiciary from second-
guessing another branch of government, the government em-
ployee's act or omission should not only involve a governmental
policy, program, or objective, but such act or omission should
216 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1953).
217 See Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 208, at 486; AIG Aviation Ins.
Servs., Inc. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Utah 1995).
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also be essential to the realization of this policy, program, or
objective. For example, the government should not be immune
from an employee's negligent driving or an employee ignoring
an obvious trip hazard on government property because such
actions do not typically involve the realization of a governmental
policy, program, or objective.
C. AN ACT, OMISSION, OR DECISION THAT INVOLVES THE
ACTUAL AND LEGITIMATE EVALUATION OF A POLICY DECISION ON
THE PART OF A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WITH THE REQUISITE
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, OR LAWFUL AUTHORITY
To DIRECT POLICY
This element is designed to correct many of the problems
with the policy/balancing approach. Several commentators have
criticized the policy/balancing approach because under recent
application of the test by the U.S. Supreme Court, the govern-
ment employee's conduct does not actually have to involve the
weighing of policy choices. 18 Instead, the employee's conduct
must merely be "susceptible to" the weighing of policy consider-
ation.219 By including the word "actual" in the definition, the
legislature would emphasize that this is a subjective test where
the court should examine whether the employee actually bal-
anced policy factors in reaching the employee's decision to act
(or not act) instead of creating a legal fiction where the court
invents hypothetical scenarios in which the employee could have
weighed policy factors.
The word "legitimate" is included to avoid the government
attempting to create a fictitious policy decision. For example,
the municipal government in Tomich passed an ordinance to
avoid maintaining the tie-downs at its municipal airport.220 Obvi-
ously, as the Tomich court noted, the airport attempted to avoid
liability by acting like it weighed legitimate policy decisions.
By including the word "legitimate" in the definition, a court
should examine the government's weighing of policy factors. It
should not second-guess the government's decision, but it also
should not allow the government to try to abdicate responsibility
by creating a fictitious weighing of policy factors.
218 See Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 208, at 487-90; Andrew Hyer,
Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Propo-
sal for a Workable Analysis, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1091, 1107 (2007).
219 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1991).
220 Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 901 P.2d 501, 504-05 (Idaho 1995).
221 Id. at 505.
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For example, if a municipal airport argues that it could not
afford to repair its tie-downs due to budgetary constraints, the
court would examine the government's budget in order to de-
termine if the government actually had the funds for repairs or
if all of the airport's funds were already allocated. If the airport's
funds were allocated, then the airport would be immune.
Finally, the phrase "employee with the requisite constitu-
tional, statutory, or lawful authority to direct policy" ensures that
the government will not attempt to use the discretionary func-
tion exception to shield everyday decisions by rank and file em-
ployees. For example, the maintenance crew in Pratt most likely
made the decision to use the air stairs to exit the gate and reach
the tarmac. 2 2 2 Thus, the definition addresses Justice Antonine
Scalia's concern that "the level at which the decision is made is
often relevant to the discretionary function inquiry, since the an-
swer to that inquiry turns on both the subject matter and the of-
fice of the decisionmaker." 2 2 3
X. APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION UNDER
A HYPOTHETICAL
With the advent of digital recording, many airports are dra-
matically increasing the number of video cameras that record
video of the airport's premises. In light of this, plaintiffs in trip
and fall cases whose falls occurred at public airports are begin-
ning to argue that the airports had actual notice of a dangerous
condition because of their ability to monitor the video cam-
eras.2 2 1 Most airports, however, cannot constantly monitor their
security cameras without significantly increasing the number of
airport employees dedicated to this task.
During a trip and fall case, the airport will inevitably argue
that the decision regarding the number of employees it dedi-
cates to monitoring its surveillance cameras is immune because
it is a discretionary function. By applying the proposed defini-
tion to this scenario, one can see that it strikes the proper bal-
ance between the concerns of both the government and
plaintiffs.
222 Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth., 97 So. 3d 68, 71-72 (Miss.
2012).
223 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
224 See Jain v. Memphis Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., No. 08-2119, 2010 WL
711319 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
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First, deciding how many employees to hire to monitor an air-
port's surveillance system involves a matter of choice because
there is no statute, rule, or regulation that mandates how many
employees to dedicate to monitoring the surveillance system.
When, where, and how to monitor the cameras is essential to
the government's safety objectives and to promote national se-
curity. Ultimately, the court must decide if the decision regard-
ing monitoring the cameras involves the actual and legitimate
evaluation of a policy decision on the part of a government em-
ployee with the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful au-
thority to direct policy. The court must examine an airport
officer or its board members' decision on how many employees
to hire to monitor the cameras. If the airport's board or officers
weighed the decision and considered such things as budgetary
constraints, a court should find the airport's actions immune
under the discretionary function exception.
XI. CONCLUSION
It appears that many jurisdictions are now using some form of
the planning/operational approach. The application of this ap-
proach, however, differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some
jurisdictions apply it very conservatively, and it appears similar to
the Good Samaritan approach derived from Indian Towing. Con-
versely, other jurisdictions have applied it liberally, which ap-
pears more like the approach described in Pratt and results in
something more akin to the semantic approach.
It is time for the legislative branch to solve the issues created
by the current discretionary function exception found in most
tort claims acts. By focusing its definition on actual and legiti-
mate policy evaluations by government employees with the req-
uisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority to direct
policy, the legislature can solve many of the pitfalls of the cur-
rent tests adopted by the various courts to determine what is a
discretionary function.
6992014]
ooLAS. I
